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Abstract
Background: Infectious disease outbreaks present unique challenges to study designs
for vaccine evaluation. Test-negative design (TND) studies have previously been used to
estimate vaccine effectiveness and have been proposed for Ebola virus disease (EVD)
vaccines. However, there are key differences in how cases and controls are recruited dur-
ing outbreaks and pandemics of novel pathogens, whcih have implications for the reli-
ability of effectiveness estimates using this design.
Methods: We use a modelling approach to quantify TND bias for a prophylactic vaccine under
varying study and epidemiological scenarios. Our model accounts for heterogeneity in vaccine
distribution and for two potential routes to testing and recruitment into the study: self-reporting
and contact-tracing. We derive conventional and hybrid TND estimators for this model and
suggest ways to translate public health response data into the parameters of the model.
Results: Using a conventional TND study, our model finds biases in vaccine effectiveness
estimates. Bias arises due to differential recruitment from self-reporting and contact-
tracing, and due to clustering of vaccination. We estimate the degree of bias when re-
cruitment route is not available, and propose a study design to eliminate the bias if re-
cruitment route is recorded.
Conclusions: Hybrid TND studies can resolve the design bias with conventional TND
studies applied to outbreak and pandemic response testing data, if those efforts collect
individuals’ routes to testing. Without route to testing, other epidemiological data will be
required to estimate the magnitude of potential bias in a conventional TND study. Since
these studies may need to be conducted retrospectively, public health responses should
obtain these data, and generic protocols for outbreak and pandemic response studies
should emphasize the need to record routes to testing.
VC The Author(s) 2021. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Epidemiological Association. 1
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Background
Study designs to evaluate new vaccines during outbreaks
and pandemics are challenging for logistical, epidemiologi-
cal, social and ethical reasons.1–7 Novel and poorly under-
stood pathogens can rapidly overwhelm local health
systems, subsequently enabling other crises, or can require
intensive control policies, complicating both response
efforts and research.8–11 However, some key pathogens are
only routinely observable under these conditions, like
Ebola virus disease (EVD) and others on the World Health
Organization (WHO) R&D Blueprint priority list.12
During outbreaks of highly pathogenic infections there
may be pressure to introduce experimental vaccines as
quickly as possible,13,14 as well as resistance to classical
randomized controlled trials.15 For EVD, the existence of a
licensed vaccine (rVSV-ZEBOV)16–19 further complicates
trials for new vaccines. Such circumstances suggest alterna-
tive evaluation strategies, and a test-negative design (TND)
study has been proposed to evaluate a two-dose vaccine in
eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).20–22 This
design estimates vaccine effectiveness from the odds ratio
for test outcome conditional on vaccination status, and has
lower misclassification bias than traditional case-control
studies.23,24
TND studies have been used to estimate the effective-
ness of vaccines against influenza,25 rotavirus,26–28 pneu-
mococcus29 and other pathogens.30,31 The approach can
also assess interventions such as vector control and risk-
factor management.32–34 TND studies recruit people with
symptoms, test those recruits using a highly sensitive and
specific method to separate cases (test-positives) from con-
trols (test-negatives), and finally sort them by vaccination
status.35 TND studies can be retrospective, potentially us-
ing stratification by other factors to limit confounding
effects. For influenza, TND studies usually recruit people
seeking care for influenza-like illness, ascertain vaccine
status by self-report, and determine infection status by re-
verse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR),
though specifics vary.25,30
To obtain unbiased estimates, the following criteria
must be met: (i) transmission occurs in a population with
partial vaccine coverage; (ii) vaccination status does not af-
fect symptom rates unrelated to the target pathogen; (iii)
given symptoms in an individual, care-seeking behaviour
does not vary by underlying cause; (iv) an individual’s past
recruitment as a control (even multiple times) must not
prevent subsequent recruitment as a case; and (v) there is
no misclassification of individuals’ infection or vaccine
status.33,36
Here we examine how outbreaks present novel misclas-
sification problems for TND studies and how this can bias
TND vaccine effectiveness estimates, and we quantify how
that bias varies with differences in vaccine distribution, re-
cruitment, risk of infection and testing practice. We intro-
duce a hybrid design that can address these biases, and we
identify alternative steps to mitigate potential bias.
Methods
Key differences during outbreaks
During outbreaks and pandemics, testing is used both to
make treatment decisions for individuals and to trigger
public health responses (e.g. testing conducted after death
or of asymptomatic contacts). For example, during EVD
outbreaks, suspect cases may be tested because of: (i) pres-
ence of symptoms; or (ii) high-risk contact with a known
case.37,38 We represent these testing reasons as distinct
recruiting routes: self-reporting people who seek care for
EVD-like symptoms (analogous to influenza studies); and
people identified via active contact-tracing from a con-
firmed case (commonly part of public health control efforts
during outbreak and pandemic responses). However,
Key Messages
• Conventional test-negative design (TND) studies can be biased when follow-up of cases leads to testing and
recruitment, which occurs for example during contact-tracing.
• A hybrid TND estimator can eliminate this bias, if individual testing routes are recorded.
• The related bias in the conventional TND estimator can be quantified using epidemiological measures.
• If testing route data is unavailable, bias can be limited by other study measures.
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depending on how data are collected, we may know total
numbers for each testing route, but not matched to out-
come. For clarity, we provide specific definitions for our
model terms (Table 1).
Vaccination model
Vaccinated individuals avoid infection if exposed to EVD
with probability E, the true vaccine efficacy. We assume
all-or-nothing vaccine protection. The study measures Ê,
the estimated vaccine effectiveness. Although there may be
a delay from vaccination to protection, e.g. a multiple dose
requirement, we model a scenario where protection has al-
ready occurred in vaccinated individuals. Aside from pre-
venting EVD, we assume vaccination has no effect on
other diseases, on self-reporting rates given symptoms or
on contact-tracing rates.
We represent vaccine distribution by dividing the
recruitable population into two types of individuals: those
targeted by the vaccination campaign and those not
(Figure 1), referred to as the targeted, pin, and non-
targeted, 1- pin, fractions (Tables 1 and 2) Among the tar-
geted population, only some individuals receive the vac-
cine, leading to a coverage level, L, in that population.
Because we consider a situation where there is already a li-
censed, efficacious vaccine, we assume there is no distribu-
tion bias (e.g. prioritization of health care workers) within
the targeted population. We assume individuals cluster by
targeted status, such as might occur if study vaccine distri-
bution targeted particular villages, so the contacts of self-
reporting cases always have the same target/non-target sta-
tus as the associated case. Aside from these distinctions, all
individuals are identical.
Ideally, a study would recruit only from targeted popu-
lations, but these may not be distinguishable in practice.
Indeed, in reality there may be many distinct populations,
for example areas with different vaccination coverage; we
consider just two, to focus on the impact of heterogeneity.
TND recruitment model
We identify recruits by their testing route, people who ei-
ther self-report or are contact-traced from a confirmed
case (Table 1 and Figure 1), because we assume these have
different criteria for testing (i.e. in our application, the self-
reporting criteria are more stringent). In the
Supplementary Material (available as Supplementary data
at IJE online), we generalise these as primary and
Table 1. Definitions of terms used in this analysis
Term Definition
Recruitable population The total population who may later be recruited into the study. In
practice unknown when the vaccination campaign occurs, but
known in the model
Vaccination campaign Administration of the study vaccine to some of the recruitable
population
Study A test-negative design (TND) study of the study vaccine against
Ebola virus disease (EVD) in the recruitable population
Targeted The portion of the recruitable population who could be vaccinated,
with vaccination homogeneously distributed. Non-targeted refers
to the complementary portion of the recruitable population: none
of these individuals receive the vaccine
Recruitment Testing for potential EVD infection and being counted in the study;
distinct from being targeted (for vaccination). Occurs via two
routes: self-reporting and contact-tracing
Self-reporting (SR) Testing of individuals without a known link to a previous case
Contact-tracing (CT) Testing of individuals because of contact with a confirmed EVD case
N, U, and V Populations for non-targeted (N), or targeted and unvaccinated (U)
or vaccinated (V)
Annotations ’ and ” Recruitment route indicators; e.g. V’ would be vaccinated individu-
als recruited via self-reporting vs N” would be non-targeted indi-
viduals recruited via contact-tracing
Subscripts þ and Test outcome indicators; e.g. U’– would be unvaccinated individuals,
recruited via self-reporting, who test negative vs V”þ would be
vaccinated individuals, recruited via contact-tracing, who test
positive
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secondary recruitment routes. We assume that introduced
cases in the recruitable population are found before any
contacts have become symptomatic and therefore infec-
tious (though they may be infected but not yet symptom-
atic), consistent with the typical experience in the rVSV-
ZEBOV trial in Guinea and deployment in DRC.17,39 In
those efforts, after identifying an index case via self-
reporting, the response programmes contact-traced around
that individual (an index case) to identify potential expo-
sures (direct contacts) and to identify people for vaccina-
tion (contacts-of-contacts) under the ring protocol. This
assumption means that in the model all self-reported cases
result from external introductions, and all contact-traced
recruits are only exposed to a single case.
Consistent with the WHO guidance for EVD outbreak
response,38 we assume self-reporting individuals present
with multiple EVD-like symptoms. Both EVD and other
causes of EVD-like symptoms lead to these self-reports,
resulting in test-positive and test-negative outcomes, re-
spectively. Targeted and non-targeted populations are as-
sumed to have equal rates of EVD exposure, but on
average the targeted population has fewer EVD cases, due
to the vaccine. Other causes of EVD-like symptoms occur
at the same rate in both populations. During an outbreak,
rates of EVD exposure and of other causes of EVD-like
symptoms may vary, but our analysis only depends on a
consistent, long-term average relative rate of these pro-




Figure 1 The modelled population and recruitment into the test-negative design study. (a) Individuals and their contacts are either targeted for vacci-
nation (filled circles—dark blue receive the vaccine and light blue do not) or not (open circles). (b) The fraction who are targeted (and thus may be vac-
cinated) is pin; none of the non-targeted population (open circles, N label) receives the vaccine. Of those targeted, some are not vaccinated (e.g.
because they are ineligible due to age, pregnancy, recent illness, immunocompromised status or because there is only sufficient study vaccine to de-
liver partial coverage) (light blue, U label) and some are (dark blue, V label). The vaccine coverage in the targeted population is L. In the recruitable
population (the combination of N, U and V), non-vaccinees (N and U) are infected on EVD exposure, whereas vaccines (V) avoid disease at the vaccine
efficacy, E. (c) An expected number of self-reported people test negative (circles with _ sign), B, until a test-positive (circle with þ sign) is identified.
This leads to an expected amount of follow-up testing, k, which finds R” more cases if the initial case is in the non-targeted population, and (1-LE)R”
if targeted. The coverage, L, efficacy, E, and targeted fraction, pin, determine the likelihood of observing the self-reporting case among targeted vs
non-targeted individuals and vaccinated vs unvaccinated individuals. (d) Resulting categories that can be recruited into the study. U and V are, re-
spectively, the unvaccinated and vaccinated individuals in the targeted population; N are non-targeted individuals. The ’ vs ’ annotations indicate, re-
spectively, self-reporting vs contact-traced, and the _ vs þ subscripts indicate test-negative and test-positive outcomes, respectively
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Table 2 Parameter summary. This table summarizes the measurements and model parameters used in this analysis. We also in-
troduce an alternative parameterization of the recruitment model, which is less intuitive when describing the model but more
useful for understanding the impact on bias
Vaccination parameters
Symbol Name Description Calculation
E True vaccine efficacy The probability of preventing
disease given an Ebola
exposure
Estimation target
Ê Estimated vaccine effectiveness Estimator, Equations 1–3
pin Targeted fraction The fraction of the recruitable
population with some vaccine
coverage; the non-targeted
fraction, 1-pin, has no vaccine
coverage
see Supplementary Material
Section S7 (available as
Supplementary data at IJE
online)
L Vaccine coverage In the targeted population, the
achieved vaccine coverage
see Supplementary Material
Section S7 (available as
Supplementary data at IJE
online)
Outbreak response metrics
SRþ Self-reported test-positive Total number of individuals who
test positive when they
self-report to a health centre
Estimated from outbreak re-
sponse metrics if available, ei-
ther before or after start of
vaccine campaignSR- Self-reported test-negative Number who test negative when
they self-report to a health
centre
CTþ Contact-traced test-positive Number who test positive after
identification by
contact-tracing from a known
case
CT- Contact-traced test-negative Number who test negative after
identification by
contact-tracing from a known
case
Recruitment parameters











R” Contact-tracing test-positive rate The expected number of new
infections among tested
contacts of a known case,
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reported test-positive, and we use the background self-
reporting test-negatives per test-positive rate, B, to repre-
sent the self-reporting process overall (Table 2).
We also represent testing of traced contacts based on
the outbreak response control protocols, which direct test-
ing based on high-risk interaction and fever.38 However,
fever is common in EVD-prone areas and may be subjec-
tively evaluated, so we assume that this criterion is practi-
cally based on high-risk contact. Thus, the average number
of tested contacts is k, which we assume is the same irre-
spective of targeted or vaccination status (Supplementary
Material, Section S3.3, available as Supplementary data at
IJE online, relaxes this assumption). These contacts are ex-
posed or not, according to the contact-tracing test-positive
rate, R”, which is reduced within the targeted population
by the vaccine.
Translating outbreak metrics to estimate bias
To evaluate a particular study’s potential bias, we need
real-world outbreak response metrics to estimate model
parameters. For studies augmenting an ongoing outbreak
response, data already collected could be used. For exam-
ple, partial data on the number of tested individuals, strati-
fied by test outcome and testing route, could be used to
bound model parameters (Table 2).
The model also depends on how the study vaccination
is distributed, represented by targeted fraction and cover-
age within that fraction, pin and L (respectively).
Depending on the study protocol, these could be ascer-
tained in different ways (Supplementary Material Section
S7, available as Supplementary data at IJE online).
Summary of assumptions
• The study period and population are sufficient to use
expected values and minimize the impact of heterogene-
ity, for example superspreading events.
• Cases and their contacts have the same targeted status.
• All individuals have the same exposure risk to EVD and
other causes of EVD-like symptoms, average number of
contacts and risk of infection per contact.
• Non-vaccination among targeted populations happens
randomly.
• There are different testing criteria for self-reporting and
contact-tracing individuals.
• Self-reporting cases are identified before anyone they
have infected becomes symptomatic, and contact-tracing
prevents transmission among contacts.
TND estimator for outbreak context
There are twelve recruitment categories in our model,
based on targeted and vaccination status (N, U and V for
non-target, unvaccinated and vaccinated respectively), test
outcome (subscripts_ and þ), and testing route (annota-
tions ’ and ”for self-reporting and contact-tracing, respec-
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The expected counts of these categories can be
expressed with the six model parameters we defined (full
derivation in Supplementary Material Sections S3–S4,
available as Supplementary data at IJE online). Recall
these are true efficacy (E), the targeted fraction of the
recruitable population (pin), the vaccine coverage in tar-
geted population (L), the number of self-reporting test-neg-
atives per test-positive (B), average number of contacts
tested per self-reporting test-positive (k), and average num-
ber of contacts that test-positive (R”). Substituting these,
we can obtain:
Ê ¼ 1 1 Eð Þ 1þ ER
0 0
1þ R0 0 1 LEð Þ







k R0 0ð Þ
Bþ 1LE1LEpin k R
0 0 1 Eð Þð Þ
(2)
The terms to the right only cancel under very specific
circumstances, thus the bias is generally non-zero and
the magnitude is a function of all model parameters. We
refactor Eq. (2) with alternative parameters relating to
recruitment and epidemiological measures from the out-
break, namely the fraction of tests that are negative for
self-reporting individuals (f–), the ratio of contact-traced
to self-reporting individuals (q), and the fraction of tests
that are positive among contact-traced individuals in the
absence of vaccination (pt) (Supplementary Material
Section S4). We use this form to explore the bias and to
evaluate potential maximum bias under specific out-
break scenarios:
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Ê ¼ 1 1 Eð Þ 1þ
E ptq1f
















1 ptð1 EÞð Þ
(3)
We also consider an alternative study design, where the
testing route is always available. With that information, it
is possible to stratify individuals into a group that matches
conventional TND requirements (i.e. self-reporting) and
another that is a natural cohort population (i.e. contact-
traced) with a common characteristic of confirmed EVD
exposure. This cohort has a mixture of vaccine uptake, and
otherwise shared demographic characteristics (under these
model assumptions). This stratification maintains TND ef-
ficiency and controls for health care-seeking behaviour,
while taking advantage of known exposure status to use
the generally preferred cohort design for the contact-traced
individuals. This results in an estimator that is a weighted







Across a wide range of self-reporting test-negative frac-
tions (f), contact-tracing test-positive fractions (pt), tar-
geted fractions (pin) and testing route ratios (q), the
absolute error in Ê is  0:1 (Figure 3). If information
from the outbreak response indicates these parameter val-
ues are bounding, then our model indicates that conven-
tional study bias lies in that range. Ideally, individual
testing routes will be available and the hybrid design can
be used. When the hybrid design cannot be used, we have
identified two avenues to limit bias, restricting recruitment
to either targeted or self-reporting individuals only.
Hybrid design: no recruitment bias
If study data permit stratifying recruits by testing route,
then an alternative study design can be used to eliminate
the design bias (Figure 2).
Consider a cohort study-like estimator of vaccine effec-








Figure 2 The modelled population and recruitment into the TND study. (a) Individuals and their contacts are either targeted for vaccination (filled
circles—dark blue receive the vaccine and light blue do not) or not (open circles). (b) The fraction who are targeted (and thus may be vaccinated) is
pin; none of the non-targeted population (open circles, N label) receives the vaccine. Of those targeted, some are not vaccinated (e.g. because they
are ineligible due to age, pregnancy, recent illness, immunocompromised status or because there is only sufficient study vaccine to deliver partial
coverage) (light blue, U label) and some are (dark blue, V label). The vaccine coverage in the targeted population is L. In the recruitable population
(the combination of N, U and V), non-vaccinees (N and U) are infected on EVD exposure, whereas vaccines (V) avoid disease at the vaccine efficacy,
E. (c) An expected number of self-reported people test negative (circles with _ sign), B, until a test-positive (circle with þ sign) is identified. This leads
to an expected amount of follow-up testing, k, which finds R” more cases if the initial case is in the non-targeted population, and (1-LE)R” if targeted.
The coverage, L, efficacy, E, and targeted fraction, pin, determine the likelihood of observing the self-reporting case among targeted vs non-targeted
individuals and vaccinated vs unvaccinated individuals. (d) Resulting categories that can be recruited into the study. U and V are, respectively, the
unvaccinated and vaccinated individuals in the targeted population; N are non-targeted individuals. The ’ vs ”annotations indicate, respectively, self-
reporting vs contact-traced, and the _ vs þ subscripts indicate test-negative and test-positive outcomes, respectively
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Under our model assumptions, this estimator is asymp-
totically equal to the true efficacy, E. The positive fraction
of contact-traced individuals will be a context-specific
transmission probability. For vaccinees, it is reduced by (1-
E). The transmission-related term cancels from the two
fractions, leaving only Ê¼ 1 – (1—E) ¼ E, indicating that
this estimator is asymptotically unbiased. When only con-
sidering self-reporting individuals, our model assumptions
match the TND requirements for an unbiased estimate,
and therefore the test-negative estimator limited to self-
reporting individuals is also asymptotically unbiased.
Thus, any weighted combination of the two estimators like
Eq. (4) is also asymptotically unbiased.
Restricting recruitment to targeted populations
Ideally, a study would strictly recruit from populations that
were targeted for vaccination. This could be achieved either
by expanding the targeted (for vaccination) population to
coincide with the potentially recruitable (by testing) popu-
lation, or by censoring the tested population to only the
population targeted for vaccination. The former may be
possible with, for example, an extensive community en-
gagement programme that results in homogeneous coverage
across a wide region. The latter may be possible if there are
additional data collected, like place of residence, that allow
exclusion of individuals outside the targeted population.
Even if the study is constrained to only a targeted
Figure 3 Bias trends across all model parameters. The figure illustrates the bias trends with respect to true efficacy, E, and vaccination coverage in
the targeted population, L. The 16 panels correspond to combinations of example values for: (outer columns) self-reporting test-negative fraction (f_
at low ¼ 0.8 and high ¼ 0.99); (inner columns) the recruitment route ratio (q at low ¼ 0.5 and high ¼ 2; less than 1 implies more self-reporting recruit-
ment, greater than 1 implies more contact-tracing recruitment); (outer rows) contact-tracing test-positive fraction (p_t at low ¼ 0.1 and high ¼ 0.3);
and the targeted fraction (pinf_- at low ¼ 0.6 and high ¼ 0.9)
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population, i.e. pin ¼ 1, some bias remains due to recruit-
ment of contact-traced individuals, but it no longer depends
on the vaccine coverage (see Supplementary Material
Section S5.1, available as Supplementary data at IJE on-
line). However, uniformly distributing a vaccine among the
population will be complicated in an outbreak response set-
ting, and the bias is sensitive to other factors even when
most of the recruited population was targeted (Figure 4).
If the targeted fraction decreases, generally the magni-
tude of bias in the estimate increases. Bias generally peaks
when the true vaccine efficacy is around 50% and goes to
zero as true efficacy approaches 0 or 100%. Because initial
cases are more likely among non-targeted populations,
contact-traced individuals are likewise biased towards be-
ing non-targeted and thus un-vaccinated. Thus, bias tends
towards overestimation as contact-traced individuals more
frequently test positive. This can reverse for high levels of
contact-traced recruitment, when most contact-traced indi-
viduals are test-negative. All other factors being equal,
more coverage means more extreme bias as targeted and
non-targeted populations diverge.
Restricting recruitment to self-reported
individuals
The bias can also be corrected by restricting recruitment
strictly to self-reported individuals. If perfectly achieved,
then the bias is 0 (see Supplementary Material S4.4).
However during outbreak response, priorities and data pro-
cesses may focus on identified cases, neglecting detailed
tracking of test-negatives. Thus in retrospective analyses,
test-negative data might only reflect vaccine status, not route
Figure 4 Impact of decreasing targeted fraction among recruits. The panels show decreasing targeted fraction (columns from left to right) for scenar-
ios stratified by self-reported test-negative fraction in recruitment (0.8 and 0.99) and recruitment route ratio (0.1 and 0.3) (rows). This figure shows
70% coverage level in the targeted population, L¼ 0.7
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to testing, whereas more detailed data for test-positives are
available. If that applies, the resulting estimator bias is:
E Ê ¼  1 Eð Þ
E
1 LEð ÞR00  L 1 pin
1 Lpin
k R00ð Þ





Minimizing and ultimately eliminating bias in Eq. (5)
still depends on maximizing pin. One way of achieving
high pin is excluding non-targeted populations. This sug-
gests a trade-off between precision and bias: if the study
invests the effort to exclude any non-targeted population,
it may make sense to include contact-traced recruits.
If contact-traced test-positives are excluded retrospec-
tively, the resulting bias magnitude may be lower even if
contact-traced test-negatives are included due to misclassi-
fication (Figure 4 vs Figure 5). However, the direction of
bias changes with changing targeted fraction (pin): the no-
bias line falls at higher contact-tracing test-positive frac-
tions (pt) when targeted fraction decreases. The magnitude
of bias at the extremes of the contact-tracing test-positive
fractions is driven largely by the number of self-reporting
test-negatives. Other factors being equal, fewer self-
reported test-negatives means a lower self-reporting test-
negative fraction (f– ¼ 0.8 versus 0.99) and higher testing
route ratio (q ¼ 0.3 versus 0.1), both of which correspond
to more extreme bias.
Figure 5 Bias due to inability to exclude contact-traced test-negatives. The panels show decreasing targeted fraction (columns from left to right) for
scenarios stratified by self-reported test-negative fraction in recruitment (0.8 and 0.99) and recruitment route ratio (0.1 and 0.3) (rows). This figure
shows 70% coverage level among targeted individuals, L¼ 0.7. The range of bias is usually smaller than when recruitment is restricted to the targeted
population only (Figure 3)
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Quantifying potential bias from outbreak
response metrics
To quantify the bias range for an EVD vaccine study in
DRC, we determined the plausible range of outbreak re-
sponse metrics and corresponding model parameters
(Table 2). We consider test-positive counts SRþ in100,150
and CTþ in,100 400 for self-reporting and contact-tracing,
respectively. We consider test-negative counts SR in
(6500, 7000) and CT in (900, 1200), for self-reporting
and contact-tracing, respectively.
When restricting recruitment to targeted populations
only, the bias in estimated effectiveness is less than 3%
overestimation (Figure 6, left panel), but can increase to
>15% overestimate if coverage is high and targeted frac-
tion is low (Figure 6, right panel; 90% coverage, 40% tar-
geted fraction). As a larger non-targeted population is
recruited, increasing coverage increases bias, correspond-
ing to the increasing distinction in infection risk between
targeted and non-targeted populations. For these outbreak
response metrics, the estimate of vaccine effectiveness con-
sistently exceeds the true efficacy.
When restricting recruitment to self-reported individu-
als only, with no misclassification of testing route for test-
negatives, there is no bias (Figure 7, left panel). As the mis-
classification increases from 0 to 100%, the magnitude of
bias increases and tends towards underestimation, though
the range of possible bias includes overestimation. For the
most extreme case, where all contact-traced test-negatives
are included in a scenario with a low targeted fraction and
high coverage, the bias spans roughly 1% overestimate to
5% underestimate (Figure 7, right panel; 90% coverage,
40% targeted fraction). As with restricting recruitment to
the targeted population, the magnitude of the bias
increases with coverage among targeted individuals.
Discussion
Previous work has explored biases in TND studies due to
care-seeking or other confounding and selection
effects,35,40,41 test or vaccine status misclassification
errors25,42–44 and vaccine mechanism.36,45 Here, we dem-
onstrate that public health response efforts can also gener-
ate bias in the effectiveness estimates of a conventional
TND study. If the response effort collects data on route to
testing, a hybrid design study is possible and does not suffer
this bias. Retaining this information should therefore be a
high priority. This hybrid design warrants further analysis,
as we have only considered it with a simplified model.
When a conventional TND study cannot distinguish
self-reported and contact-traced recruits, nor whether
recruits were generally among a population targeted for
vaccination, then the vaccine effectiveness estimate is po-
tentially biased. These are both real, practical problems: in
addition to general difficulty in collecting data during an
outbreak, it may be difficult to achieve uniform levels of
coverage when deploying a vaccine in an emergency set-
ting, particularly in highly mobile populations or those af-
fected by civil unrest.
In our model, the bias arises from the interaction of het-
erogeneous vaccination distribution and the inclusion of
tested individuals from contact-tracing. Because initial
cases found through self-reporting are more likely to be
Figure 6 Bias possible when recruiting targeted individuals only. These bias envelopes were computed assuming outbreak response metrics For
Review Only [“SR” ]_-2(6500, 7000), [“SR” ]_þ2(100, 150), [“CT” ]_þ2(100, 400) and [“CT” ]_-2(900, 1200), which corresponds to 97.7–98.6% of self-
reporting cases testing negative, testing 6–16 contact-traced individuals per self-reported case and 10–25% of those contact-traced individuals testing
positive. If the study is restricted to recruit only the targeted population (leftmost panel), then bias can be limited to less than 3% overestimation.
However, as the targeted fraction falls, the error range generally increases, to >15% peak bias for high coverage (90%) and low targeted fraction
(40%). Higher coverage in the targeted population generally increases bias; this reflects increasing differences between the targeted and non-targeted
individuals
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non-targeted (and thus unvaccinated) individuals, includ-
ing contact-traced recruits over-represents those individu-
als in the estimator. This in turn can tilt the bias either
towards or away from the null, depending on how infec-
tion risk and testing criteria differ in the contact-traced
population versus the general population. If the self-
reporting process leads to many more test-negative recruits
than recruits from contact-tracing (either positive or nega-
tive), then the bias from contact-tracing is relatively
smaller. If it does not, then the relative number of cases
versus controls from contact-tracing will determine the
general direction of bias: more cases lead to overestima-
tion, more controls lead to underestimation.
The ideal solution is to maintain data on route to testing
but, if that does not occur, we show that the range of po-
tential bias can be quantified with aggregate epidemiologi-
cal data from an outbreak. For the range of outbreak
response metrics we used to represent the EVD outbreak in
DRC, this is less than 10% if the study can achieve high
targeted fraction (pin  0:6) with at most moderate cover-
age (L  0:7).
Practically, it may be possible to limit but not eliminate
these drivers of the bias. For the EVD epidemic in eastern
DRC, responders tried to test individuals meeting one of
the outbreak ‘suspected case’ definitions which combine
different levels of symptoms and potential contact with
known cases.37,38 This practice would likely continue in
populations that received a study vaccine, meaning this
testing process would be the likely source for a retrospec-
tive TND study of a new vaccine.
We framed our analysis in terms of event counts, but it
can also be thought of in terms of testing thresholds. For
example, we frame contact-tracing recruitment as a number
of contacts and the number of cases among them. The result-
ing effectiveness estimator error is then driven by the ratio of
those values. In an infectious disease sense, this ratio is the
transmission probability, but it could instead be interpreted
in terms of the sensitivity of the criteria for testing: should
testing criteria be stricter to conserve limited resources, or
more relaxed to ensure no positives are missed? A similar
analogy applies for testing self-reporting individuals. For
both self-reported and contact-traced testing, bias in the vac-
cine effectiveness estimate is generally lower when testing
criteria are less strict (i.e. the protocol is more sensitive), con-
sistent with a control-oriented outbreak response, whereas a
more resource-limited response would have higher bias.
Our analysis describes vaccination during EVD out-
breaks, but our work has general implications for evaluat-
ing interventions in other infectious disease settings with a
public health response that includes testing, for example
efforts to control the COVID-19 pandemic. We have fo-
cused on self-reporting and contact-tracing, but the chal-
lenges are generic when there are distinct, but potentially
undistinguished, primary and secondary recruiting pro-
cesses. For example, more active general-population sur-
veillance could still qualify as the primary recruitment in
our model, as long as it were random with respect to inter-
vention status. Likewise, geographical follow-up could be
a secondary process, as long as intervention status were
correlated with the secondary process (e.g. for dengue, ad-
jacent households followed up, as long as vector control
reached some areas and not others).
This analysis of the conventional TND and hybrid de-
sign under outbreak conditions does not consider other
Figure 7 Bias possible when recruitment is restricted to self-reported individuals only. If the study analysis is able to restrict recruits to only self-
reporting individuals, then there is no bias (left panel). However, as For Review Only contact-traced test-negative individuals are increasingly included
(moving right across panels), bias range increases to between 1% overestimate and 5% underestimate. However, this range is notably smaller than if
only recruiting from the targeted population (Figure 5). As with restricting recruitment to targeted individuals only, higher levels of coverage lead to
wider bias range. These ranges reflect the same parameters used in Figure 6, including targeted fraction p_in 2(0.4,1). In this figure, the overestimate
bounds (upper ribbon lines) closely align
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possible sources of bias, such as different exposure risk be-
tween groups, testing errors or errors in ascertaining vac-
cine status. Further investigation of the reliability of these
studies for estimating effectiveness during outbreaks
remains critical. However, as we have shown, use of this
design in an outbreak setting will need to account for the
realities of control activities and plan to collect data on
testing route or otherwise accommodate the mix of recruit-
ment routes.
Adoption of a TND or hybrid design to evaluate a new
vaccine in DRC may increase pressure for similar studies
that do not have an explicit, randomized control group in
future outbreaks of similarly highly pathogenic diseases.
Understanding the biases and limitations of these designs
will therefore be critical to evaluate vaccines that are cur-
rently being developed against these pathogens. All analy-
sis code is available from [https://gitlab.com/ebovac/
TNCC_math].
Supplementary Data
Supplementary data are available at IJE online.
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